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Perspectives on Progress 2013 Conference Paper 
 
"Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the Progress of Science" 
 
The questions of whether science pursues truth as correspondence to reality and whether 
science in fact progresses towards attaining a truthful understanding of physical reality are 
fundamental and contested in the philosophy of science.  On one side of the debate stands 
Popper, who argues that science is objective, necessarily assumes a correspondence theory of 
truth, and inevitably progresses toward truth as physical theories develop, gaining a more 
truthful understanding of reality through progressively more sophisticated empirical 
analysis.  Conversely Kuhn, influenced by postmodern philosophy, argues that ultimate truth 
cannot be attained since no objective metaphysical reality exists and it cannot be known, and 
consequently the notion of scientific objectivity and "progress" is a myth, marred by 
philosophical and ideological value judgments.  Ultimately, Kuhn reduces so-called scientific 
progress through the adoption of successive paradigms to leaps of "faith".  This paper seeks a 
reconciliation of the two extremes, arguing that Popper is correct in the sense that science 
assumes a correspondence theory of truth and may progress toward truth as physical theories 
develop, while simultaneously acknowledging with Kuhn that science is not purely objective 
and free of value judgments.  The notion of faith is also critical, for it was the 
acknowledgement of God's existence as the creator and instituter of observable natural laws 
which allowed the development of science and the scientific method in the first 
place.  Therefore, accepting and synthesising the contentions that science is to some extent 
founded on faith, assumes and progresses toward truth, and is subject to value judgments is 
necessary for the progress of science. 
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Definition, Aims and Method of Science 
 
Science is the academic discipline which seeks to provide systematic descriptions and 
explanations of physical reality.  Fundamentally then, the aim of science is to understand the 
world.  As Roger Newton states, “scientific explanations must be part of an intellectual 
structure that is ultimately justified by objective, public evidence obtained by observation and 
experimentation on nature.”1 
 
Popper and Truth 
 
A way of testing the validity of established scientific theories or laws is by virtue of Karl 
Popper’s notion of falsifiability.  A scientific law cannot be completely verified, for to do so 
would take an infinite number of attempts.  However, because laws have the form of a 
proposition, they can be disproved (proven to be false) by a single negative observation, or 
undermined (or confirmed) by such an observation.2  Peer review keeps the official scientific 
literature reasonably honest and factually reliable through setting high standards of technical 
performance, and favouring precise, thorough and cogent argumentation.  However, it does 
not pretend to eliminate error and does not guarantee certainty or truth.3  Indeed, the nature of 
science is that it is a perpetual discussion as more data is located, and different interpretations 
are proposed.  In this sense, the ‘truth’ of many scientific theories continues to be contested. 
 
This notion of truth is a central one.  The most common meaning of truth is the Aristotelian 
theory of correspondence: that truth is a proposition that corresponds to the state of affairs, or 
is a representation of nature.  For example, the statement ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if 
the snow is, in fact, white.  It is agreed that a scientific theory is never true in the ultimate 
sense: at best it can only approach the truth, because the discussion is always continuing.4  
Nevertheless, science progresses and draws closer to the truth by locating errors in theories 
through experimentation, and adjusting or discarding theories in order to produce theoretical 
accord with what is observed to be physical reality.5  Hence in science, we are out to find true 
theories, or at least theories that better correspond to the facts than other theories.6  Karl 
Popper thus concludes that  
the idea of truth, in the sense of correspondence with the facts, and the idea of content (which 
may be measured by the same measure as testability) – play about equally important roles in 
our considerations, and that both can shed much light on the idea of progress in science. 
                                                            
1 Newton, R, The Truth of Science: Physical Theories and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997 
at 45-47. 
2 Chalmers, A, What is this Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1999 at 111, 113, 
115. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Newton, above n 1 at 211-212. 
5 Callow, J, In Search for Truth in Science: A Critique of Modern Physics and the Basis of a New Theory, 
Frickers Publishing, Inglewood, 1999 at  6-7, 9. 
6 Popper, K, Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1979 
at 23, 26. 
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This is so in the sense that we aim to ‘progress’ scientific theories, or approach closer and 
closer to the truth.7  Popper lists six ways in which a theory may be said to ‘better correspond 
to the facts of reality’, and consequently be ‘more true’:  Firstly, theory t2 makes more precise 
assertions than theory t1, and these more precise assertions stand up to more precise tests; 
secondly, t2 takes account of and explains more facts than t1; thirdly, t2 describes or explains 
the facts in more detail than t1; fourthly t2 has passed tests which t1 failed to pass; fifthly, t2 
has suggested new experimental tests not suggested by previous theories, and has passed 
these tests; and finally, t2 has unified or connected previously unrelated problems.  Hence, t2 
will be observed to be ‘more true’ than t1.8  It is important at this point to note the implicit 
assumption that specificity and unity of structure demonstrate that a theory is closer to truly 
understanding the nature of physical reality, and I will return to this later.  For now, truth in 
science is consequently regulative in the sense that an independently testable theory that is 
also true would provide successful predictions.  Successful predictions are not sufficient 
conditions for the truth of a theory, but they are necessary conditions.  Hence, we should be 
anxious to reduce the falsity-content of scientific theories while simultaneously strengthening 
their truth-content.9  Following this reasoning, Karl Popper accepts the correspondence 
theory of truth and states that it is an essential, if not necessarily explicit, foundation for 
scientific progress.10   
 
Moreover, this prevalent doctrine that scientific methods are self-corrective in the sense that 
scientific development is inexorably moving closer and closer to the truth by a process of 
scientific approximation has an extended pedigree which has its basis in the Enlightenment 
view of scientific progress.11  The self-correcting thesis amounts to the following claims: that 
the scientific method is such that its use will eventually refute a theory T if T is false, and 
Science possesses a method for finding an alternative T’ which is closer to the truth than the 
refuted T.12   
 
The Response of Kuhn 
 
However, Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions rejects this formulation 
espoused by Popper.  In particular, he denies that prevailing scientific theories are simply 
altered accordingly as new evidence arises.  Instead, the prevailing scientific theory will be 
maintained despite its inability to explain the data, until a new theory is proposed which 
properly explains the data in addition to possessing an accumulation of other evidence, and 
then there will be a “scientific revolution” and this theory will become the prevailing 
                                                            
7 Id at 31. 
8 Id at 32-33. 
9 Id at 53-54. 
10 Id at 18-20. 
11 Laudan, L, ‘Peirce and the Trivialization of the Self-Correcting Thesis’, in Giere, R, and Westfall, R, (eds) 
Foundations of the Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century, Indiana University Press, London, 1973 at 276-
278. 
12 Id at 279. 
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theory.13  According to Kuhn, observation, experience and the scientific method can and must 
restrict the range of scientific belief, or there would be no science.  However, this cannot 
alone determine a particular body of such belief, for an apparently arbitrary element 
composed of personal and historical accident is a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused 
by a particular scientific community at a particular time.14  Kuhn calls these beliefs 
‘paradigms’.15  New theories are proposed based on the discovery of new facts (or vice versa) 
which contradict the incumbent paradigm, leading to the construction and adoption of a new 
paradigm.16  However, scientists rarely undertake such a construction due to the influence of 
the predominant paradigm, and it is only just prior or subsequent to a paradigm shift that such 
a construction can feasibly occur.17  Even when apparent anomalies exist, scientists will 
attempt to alter theories in an ad hoc fashion to eliminate apparent conflict and avoid a 
paradigm shift: and that is something which is philosophical and ideological, not scientific.18   
 
In this sense, Kuhn also notes the importance of values in scientific evaluation and 
adoption/rejection of theories and paradigms, stating that “judgments of simplicity, 
consistency, plausibility, and so on often vary greatly from individual to individual”, with the 
result that those different values dictate different choices.19  Therefore, the ‘correct’ paradigm 
is not determined with recourse to the real world or logical deduction, but is ultimately 
rhetorical.20  An example of this is the depreciation of historical fact deeply and functionally 
embedded in the ideology of the scientific profession, in the sense that textbooks and other 
scientific publications endeavour to demonstrate the linear and cumulative progression of 
science, rather than the revolutions that have occurred.  Hence science tends to forget or 
revise the scientific theories and theoreticians of the past.21  Furthermore, Kuhn argues, a 
scientific theory cannot be true in the sense of exactly describing and corresponding to 
reality, for we have no independent access to such a reality.22  In the final analysis then, Kuhn 
questions the Popperian notion that science is inevitably progressing towards comprehending 
the truth of physical reality based on the evidence of objective, reasonable, empirical 
observations.23  Indeed, Kuhn even goes as far as to say that: 
The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the 
evidence provided by problem-solving.  He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm 
will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older 
paradigm has failed with a few.  A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.24   
 
                                                            
13 Kuhn, T, ‘The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions’, in Cahoone, L, (ed) From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2003 at 200-208. 
14 Kuhn, P, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970 at 4-5. 
15 Id at 10. 
16 Id at 66. 
17 Id at 76. 
18 Id at 78. 
19 Id at 185. 
20 Id at 94. 
21 Id at 138-139. 
22 Kuhn, above n 13 at 200-208. 
23 Kuhn, above n 14 at 170-171. 
24 Id at 158. 
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The Basis of Science in Faith 
 
It seems to me that Kuhn’s reference to faith is neither coincidental nor inappropriate, for 
God’s existence (or at least the belief in God’s existence) is foundational to the development 
of science and the scientific method.  Sociological and historical analyses have revealed the 
significant extrascientific influence undergirding the so-called Scientific Revolution, 
particularly a Judeo-Christian theological framework of God as the Creator and Instituter of 
natural laws.25  Issues in theology, particularly debates over the attributes and creative powers 
of God, promoted and directed the study of nature in the early modern period.26  For example, 
the teleological element of believing in God’s existence (that is, assuming there is some 
divine purpose in creation/nature which has been instituted by God) reinforced a deep 
scientific belief that there is a unity of purpose and structure in the universe, which science 
attempts to discover.27  This theological foundation, is, I think, the reason why there is such 
an emphasis on precision in science, and the unity of science mentioned before – manifested 
through such endeavours as a Grand Unified Theory in physics.  So for those Christians who 
were scientists and embraced Newtonian mechanics as a series of precise, invariable physical 
laws governing nature in a unified way, this demonstrated the power and omniscience of 
God.28 Similarly, some early scientists, such as Boyle and Newton, were voluntarists who 
emphasised God’s freedom and omnipotence, and believed that a priori knowledge of nature 
was impossible.  As such, since God had freely chosen to create this world as opposed to 
some other possible world, the only way to learn what kind of world God had created was to 
study it empirically.29 However, it was Kepler who fully completed the link between religion 
and science, for his ideas about God provided him with a hypothesis, he had the mathematical 
ability to systematise his findings, and the progress of previous medieval scientists enabled 
him to check whether this system was empirically accurate – and for the most part, it was.30  
Kepler’s astronomy was (explicitly from his perspective) therefore designed at discovering 
and systematising this plan through which a perfect God had expressed himself.31   
 
The desire to worship God by actively studying his creation is therefore a distinctly Christian 
imperative based in faith, for when we observe the orderly causes of the world, it drives us to 
know that first cause of all other causes who we believe by faith: God.32  This rendered 
science a legitimate area of study, and because God was consistent and not capricious, these 
natural laws were constant, orderly, immutable, and worth scrutinising.  These motivations 
                                                            
25 Id at 10. 
26 Jenkins, J, ‘Arguing about Nothing: Henry More and Robert Boyle on the Theological Implications of the 
Void’, in Osler, M, (ed) Rethinking the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 
159. 
27 Williams, L, ‘Kant, Naturophilosophie and Scientific Method’, in Giere, R, and Westfall, R, (eds) 
Foundations of the Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century, Indiana University Press, London, 1973 at 9-11. 
28 Hull, D, ‘Charles Darwin and Nineteenth Century Philosophies of Science’, in Giere, R, and Westfall, R, 
(eds) Foundations of the Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century, Indiana University Press, London, 1973 at 
123. 
29 Wojcik, J, ‘Pursuing Knowledge: Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton’, in Osler, M, (ed) Rethinking the Scientific 
Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 184. 
30 Hannam, J, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science, Icon 
Books, London, 2009 at 288-292. 
31 Barker, P, ‘The Role of Religion in the Lutheran Response to Copernicus’, in Osler, M, (ed) Rethinking the 
Scientific Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 85-86. 
32 Hannam, above n 30 at 227. 
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and justifications were maintained almost uniformly over all the pioneers of modern science 
because, as Isaac Newton once said, scientific inquiry is a religious duty because nature 
reflects the creativity of its maker.33  In this sense, the notion of faith in the progress of 
science is therefore critical, because it furnished and continues to furnish a conceptual 
framework in which the study of physical reality can occur, and also emphasises the deep 
sense of humility and reverence with which we should approach scientific discovery. 
 
The Progress of Science 
 
Undoubtedly there are many scientists who denigrate faith and seldom doubt the ‘truth’ that 
science produces.  However, philosophers of science and scientists who think philosophically 
now recognise that science no longer holds the epistemological advantage it once had, and 
that anything complex in science is inevitably theory-laden, and all complex theories include 
components which are not themselves directly demonstrable by empirical means.34  However, 
the Popperian recognition that the scientific community seeks and finds truth in the sense of 
uncovering propositions about physical reality is fully compatible with Kuhn’s view that the 
truths science seeks and finds are often selected according to various interests and 
prejudices.35  Hence, we do not have to deny that science is capable of discovering truths and 
that it sometimes does do so in order to recognise the various ways and enormous degrees to 
which the worldview, the methods, and the results of the scientific community at any time 
and place are products of non-empirical interests and prejudices which are ultimately 
believed by faith.36   
 
The theologian John Milbank in particular argues that modern or enlightenment science was 
intended to promote objective truth and was essentially positivist in character, relying upon 
so-called indefeasible sense-impressions of external facts of reality, which was governed by 
an immutable system of natural laws.37  However, science, rather than providing a true 
ontology, in reality only provides a very limited disclosure of certain aspects of reality 
lending themselves to manipulation and prediction, as the likes of Kuhn have shown.38  
Ultimately, due to its rejection of faith and subjectivity, science generally as a discipline is 
indifferent to anything but abstract power, and does not merely override past attachments or 
theoretical prejudices, but keeps them in reserve, so it can potentially recruit them to the 
interests of domination.39  In other words, this completely objective and reasonable truth of 
science which excludes faith and subjectivity is merely the truth of instrumental control.  This 
is because the isolation of repeatable observations and closed formal systems relate to the 
merely particular, not also to the general or universal.  In contrast, theology, as the study of 
                                                            
33 Id at 340-341. 
34 Carson, D, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 1996 at 86, 90. 
35 Griffin, D, ‘Introduction: The Reenchantment of Science’, in Griffin, D (ed) The Reenchantment of Science: 
Postmodern Proposals, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1988 at 3, 6. 
36 Id at 8-10. 
37 Milbank, J, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1990 at 264. 
38 Milbank, J, and Pickstock, C, Truth in Aquinas, Routledge, New York, 2001 at xii. 
39 Milbank, above n 37 at 274-275.  It should be noted that there would be individual exceptions to this, but it is 
the discipline generally that is being described. 
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the universal through the particular of faith, can provide an ontology which promotes the 
humble study of the physical world as the created order, and as part of the created order.40 
 
For Milbank, the certainty of natural science does not reside in its representation of reality, 
but in its power of repetition and ordered change which is nonetheless open to embracing 
unpredictability.  Moreover, the implicit ontology of modern science suggests not uniformity 
and objectivity, but randomness, difference and uncertainty – an obvious example being the 
findings of Quantum Mechanics.41  The element of uncertainty in conjunction with the 
element of difference therefore allows the invocation of the transcendent, triune God by faith, 
in whom difference is perfectly united.  This allows one to think of reason itself as unknown 
and yet real – that is, of an infinite divine reason in which we participate by faith, as 
discussed by Thomas Aquinas.  By acknowledging the limits of reason, that reason is not 
supreme or omniscient, and combining it with faith, we allow the incorporation of the 
intersubjective nature of scientific inquiry in conjunction with its foundation in Christian 
theology.  Therefore, it is only through this way of uniting faith with reason and 
incorporating Trinitarian theology as a conceptual framework, trusting and participating in 
the divine reason revealed by the God who created all things, that both matter and reason and 
the study of it through science are saved, and a foundation is provided for a mode of scientific 
inquiry which humbly acknowledges its need to trust, yet simultaneously pursues and 
explains truth in the created order.  In the final analysis, it is this science, one that pursues 
truth yet acknowledges subjectivity, and one that seeks to understand the material yet humbly 
trusts the immaterial, which enables progress in the understanding of reality without the need 
for instrumental control and the elimination of subjectivity.42   
                                                            
40 Id at 259-260. 
41 Id at 263. 
42 Id at 288. 
